Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences




INTERBEHAVIORAL
PSYCHOLOGY
# NEWSLETTER

Volume 5
Number 3
Summer 1974

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

...when the fingers are crossed, the one object [placed between them] is felt by the touch] as two; but yet we deny that it is two; for sight is more authoritative than touch. Yet, if touch stood alone, we should actually have pronounced the one object to be two. The ground of such false judgements is that any appearances whatever present themselves, not only when its object stimulates a sense, but also when the sense by itself alone is stimulated, provided only it be stimulated in the same manner as it is by the object. For example, to persons sailing past, the land seems to move when it is really the eye that is being moved by something else [the moving ship]. From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects or from causes within the body, present themselves not only when persons are awake, but also then, when this affection which is called sleep has come upon them, with even greater impressiveness.

Aristotle: "On Dreams"

## THE AGORA

The long teaching career of Dr. Kantor has its continuance yet today 15 years after his retirement. In June Donna Cone spent a period of time with him working on papers and gaining a more extensive understanding of interbehaviorism. The enduring influence of Dr. Kantor is indicated by the second generation of students who find great inspiration and remarkable freshness in his work. Examples can be seen in the publication of Jim Herrick ("Kantor's anticipation of current approaches in anthropology") and of Wayne Lazar ("A comparison of some theoretical proposals of J. R. Kantor and T. C. Schnierla") both in the Spring issue of the Psychological Record.

***

Jim has obtained a position at Mohawk Valley Community College in Utica, New York, while completing his dissertation for a doctorate in anthropology at the State University in Albany. Wayne is in need of a job in September and would appreciate any leads.

Harry Mahan seems to be an inexhaustible source of inexpensive innovative teaching materials of interest to interbehaviorists. For a course in neuropsychology he has ten tape study cassettes that include his own unpublished case materials, an illustrated study guide, and a textbook—all for $10. He also has shortcut procedures for the electronic calculator that he will send gratis. Write him at the Department of Psychology, Palomar College, San Marcos, California 92060.

***

The editor returned from 30 days in Greece and found greeting him in his mailbox the summer issue of the Psychological Record with his article "The ancient background to Greek Psychology and some implications for today." Off prints are being distributed with this Newsletter. While in Athens he visited the namesake of this column wherein are the ruins of the Stoa of Zeus where Socrates was tried and the Stoa Poikile or Painted Stoa where Zeno began Stoicism and where other philosophers as well liked to gather for discussions. The Painted Stoa had a southern exposure that made it especially attractive in the winter months. It was in the Agora and in the vicinity of the Temple of Zeus on the other side of Acropolis that Socrates conducted many of his discourses. A house that he visited has also been identified. The several legendary locations said to be his place of imprisonment during which the famous dialogue portrayed in the Phaedo occurs vary from a cave on the side of the Acropolis to some cavities on the nearby Hill of the Muses. They all seem to be apocryphal. The location of Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum seem to be unknown to modern Athenians, but research subsequent to returning indicates that they are buried under modern city streets and buildings west of the Kerameikos (potter's quarters and entrance to the ancient city). A number of color slides taken on the trip of Minoan, Mycean, and various stages up to Classical remains will be used in the fall to illustrate a bit of the first portion of a course in the history of psychology. Outstanding in this respect are the various measures used in the Parthenon to offset perceptual illustions. These are incredible from the point of view of both psychology and engineering.

***

Readers may be interested in the article by Endel Tulving, "Cue-Dependent Forgetting" in the January-February 1974 American Scientist. Through use of different terminology he emphasizes the nature and function of stimulus objects in forgetting as opposed to strictly internal determiners and even hints at a concept of substitute stimulation. A book that may elude the notice of psychologists interested in learning and intelligence is THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINKING: AN EXPLORATION IN CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY by Michael Cole, John Gay, Joseph Glick, and Donald Sharp published by Basic Books in 1961. The authors' view "denies the existence of a general deficit, denies the existence of a social pathology (in the sense intended by psychologists and educators) and relies on observational and linguistic evidence to claim that the poor performance of minority groups on psychological tests is the result of various situational factors" (p. 223). They conclude that "cultural differences in cognition reside more in the situations to which particular cognitive processes are applied than in the existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another" (p.233).

***

A number of reprints are available from the Psychological Record at nominal cost. Because they may be of interest to readers either for personal use or class adoption, the current list is being reproduced in this issue. Write The Psychological Record, Denison University, Granville, Ohio 43023. The feature article is

one given by David Miller at the 1973 Cheiron Society meeting. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas and gave the paper on George Herbert Mead at the symposium on "Contextual Interactionists." The paper on Mead is available among the reprints listed. In the present paper, the term "mind" is used centrally. It is a difficult term to use without construing it as an entity or allowing it to revert to a role in historical dualism. The reader may wish to see how it fares in this work.

***

Offered @ $1.00 each. Ten or more (assorted) @ 40% discount. No handling charge if prepaid.

AVAILABLE REPRINTS

Contextual Interactionists: A symposium. (A group of 5 papers authored by Clarence Shute, David Miller, Rollo Handy, Paul Fuller, Parker Lichtenstein)

Bijou, Sidney W.:
1. Theory & Research in Mental (Developmental) Retardation
2. Methodology for Experimental Studies of Young Children in natural settings.

Chun, Ki Taek & Sarbin, T. R.: Methodological Artifacts in Subception Research

Ferster, C.B.: An Experimental Analysis of Clinical Phenomena.

Feister, C. B., & S. Culbertson, A Psychology Learning Center.

Greenspoon, Joel & Simkin, L.: A Measurement Approach to Psychotherapy.

Guertin, W. H. et al: Research with the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Adults: 1965-1970.

Homme, Lloyd et al: What Behavioral Engineering Is

Kantor, J. R.
1. Behaviorism in the History of Psychology
2. Feelings & Emotions as Scientific Events
3. Newton's Influence on the Development of Psychology
4. Scientific Psychology & Specious Philosophy
5. Segregation in Science: A Historico-Cultural Analysis
6. System Structure & Scientific Psychology

Kellogg, W. N.: Chimpanzees in Experimental Homes.

Kuo, Zing-Yang & Yut-hang, Lam: Chinese Religious Behavior & the Deification of Mao Tse-tung.

Lichtenstein, P.E.:
1. Pschological Systems: Their Nature & Function
2. A Behvioral Approach to "Phoenomenological Data"
3. Genius as Productive Neurosis

Morris, Charles & Kimbrell, G. McA.: Performance & Attitudinal Effects of the Keller Method in an Introductory Psychology Course

Ratner, Stanley C.: Comparative Psychology: Some Distinctions from Animal Behavior.

Rice, Charles E.: Perceptual Enhancement in the Early Blind.

Schoefeld, W. N., Note on a bit of Psychological Nonsense: Race Differences in Intelligence

Smith, Noel W.: Interbehavioral Psychology: Roots and Branches

Stephenson, William: Applications of Communication Theory: (3 separate papers)
1. Substructure of Science
2. Interpretations of Keats' Ode on a Grecian Urn
3. Intelligence & Multivalued Choice

Weiner, Harold: Human Behavioral Persistence

# CAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS BE HUMANE?

David L. Miller
University of Texas, Austin

In connection with this subject I want to refer at least obliquely to the philosophy of George Herbert Mead. But first let me point out that in the Western world, especially from the time of the Renaissance to the present, much progress has been made toward recognizing and openly acknowledging the value of the individual, the person. This theory is exhibited in especially our political theory and in scientific method, or in democracies and in the experimental sciences. Often we speak of such things as civil liberties, individual rights, freedom, self-actualization, self-determination, ingenuity, new hypotheses, creativity, and individualism. All of these are based on the implicit or explicit assumption that a new baby has been born in the West, that at last the individual, the person, subject or self, has been severed from the umbilical cord of the tribe and from restraining static customs or stagnant institutions.

In fact, that baby, prized so dearly, is the basis for modern science and for what we call self-actualization or self-development. And I am suggesting that paradoxically several of our so-called social scientists have emptied the baby with the bath water.

To be more explicit, I am pointing out what everyone knows; namely, that some social scientists, including especially some psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, in their zeal for being scientific and objective, have adopted categories and conceptual explanatory terms that belong properly to physics, chemistry or biology exclusively, but these concepts by themselves are inadequate in explaining the subject matter of the humanities. But rather than understand and admit this inadequacy, many would rather deny that social scientists have a subject matter of their own. That subject matter is human beings with individual minds and selves, something, I believe, that is irreducibly and qualitatively different from the objects of physics, say.

Here your first reaction may be that I am suggesting that this new baby, this new self that emerged first in the West, is a sort of supernatural, mythical or mystical entity, and that we should try to understand it from a mediaeval, pre-Renaissance point of view, or that we cannot treat it scientifically. Not at all. It both belongs to the natural order and it is humane. My complaint, rather, is that some of us have assumed, probably unwittingly, that if anything is natural, it is the same kind of thing that is treated by the physical scientists, and, of course, such a treatment empties the baby with the bath.

Can we be scientific and also humane in the sense that we can offer a scientific understanding of a kind of process in nature? I mean the symbolic process, nind, or the self. My answer is yes. And despite my lamenting, I am most encouraged to find that some know what this involves and are working strenuously toward that end.

I have studied several of the important works of the honorable Professor Kantor, and I quote most approvingly only a few of the relevant passages by him.

In Interbehavioral Psychology Professor Kantor says:

"Psychological events are adjustments of organisms to environing things" p. 86.

Also, "... [A]ny factor dissected out for research purposes must always be handled with direct reference to the entire unit from which it was taken" Ibid. 19.

Again, "We must place ourselves on an interbehavioral foundation" Ibid 25.

Once more, "...mind is not a substance or quality, but action - - the ways in which an individual adapts himself to the things and conditions in his milieu now psychological action is interaction" (The Evolution of Mind," Psychological Review, 1935, Vol. 52, 455-465.)

Finally, "The specifically psychological activities are intimately connected with what, for want of a better term, we call social phenomena - - those essentially human features of an organism's surroundings" Ibid., p. 464.

Nor should we forget the laudable work done by Professor Noel Smith. I quote from his work only one passage relevant to the purpose at hand. He writes: "Interbehaviorism starts with events, and holds that all events occur in a field of other events, never in isolation." (Interbehavioral Psychology, Roots and Branches," a paper, 1972, p. 3 [Psychological Record, 1973, 23, 153-167 - ed.]).

Professor Kantor and his students are committed to the thesis that there are minds, selves, persons, but they exist only in connection with biological organisms and environment. They agree also that although minds operate in a field, and that mind involves action and interaction, still we cannot assimilate the individual mind, the self, or the person to those social and environmental conditions in which it operates.

This is quite a contrast to B. F. Skinner's view. He says: "I am a radical behaviorist in the sense that I find no place for the formulation of anything which is mental" (Behaviorism and Phenomenology, ed. by T. W. Wann. University of Chicago Press, 1964, p.106.)

In his writings, Noel Smith has illuminated a point that seems almost obvious, but its implications are profoundand very extensive. He shows that one cannot define or even conceive clearly of the meaning of "response" apart from stimulus, organism and environment. He is not claiming that a response as response is a stimulus or a part of the biological organism per se or a part of the environment of the organism. Rather, he is saying that a response is a phase of an act of adjustment, a phase that must be explained in terms of other phases and conditions, but it cannot be assimilated to them. This view is at the very basis of what has been called interactionism, organicism, or, in general, process philosophy.

Skinner is not an organicist. He is an atomist in the sense that he believes that the phases of behavior are in reality parts that can exist in isolation. No wonder he cannot get these analytic, atomic, parts together into an organic whole. He mistakes abstractions for concrete reality. Hume saw clearly that if one starts with atomic, analytic parts as real, no connection, necessary or otherwise, can be found between them. But even Skinner has never touched a habit, he has never smelt one, nor has he ever seen one.

Now if we should go to the opposite extreme from Skinner we would find an almost perfect exemplification of it in the attitude of Robert M. Hutchins of 1930, then president of the University of Chicago. Partially under the influence of J. Mortimer Adler, Hutchins believed that the sciences could not offer an understanding of man, of the self, of the person. He recommended that we return to a pre-scientific Mediaeval approach for that understanding, and apparent ly he thought of the self as some kind of mythical entity. One of Mr. Hutchins' most unfortunate limitations consisted in his inability to see that under his very eyes and within his own university there was a man, George Herbert Mead, who was offering a naturalistic account of the self, an account that took into consideration the scientific method and all of the latest findings of biology, neurology, psychology, anthropology, and the physical sciences.

All I want to say here is that Mead conceived of mind and the self as a process, but a process that is a phase of a more inclusive process, which is the social process of adjustment.

The organism has experiences before it has awareness. Awareness grows out of experience and awareness is essential to the existence of both minds and selves.

Mind is a case in which one can respond to stimuli in their absence or, it is a case in which one can by use of language gestures, indicate to himself and to another both the character of the stimulus and the form of the response made to it in its absence. That is, the minded organism can, on the basis of prior experience, anticipate or predict, and consequently, it can select in advance, or in the absence of stimuli, the kind of stimulus to which it will later respond.

Mind emerges out of a social process; it is in nature, and nature is not in mind.

If we are to evade Cartesian dualism (which precludes a functional relationship between mind and body) or if we are to evade parallelism, which is a species of dualism, without resorting to mysticism, then we must conceive of mind as a natural emergent, as a phase of the social process.

Mind must be conceived of as a culmination of that evolutionary process which is found throughout the universe.

Our problem is to explain precisely how mind arises out of an earlier process in which there was no mind and how, consequently, mind is a phase of, or interrelated with, other natural phases including other men, biological organisms, and an environment. When this is done, then we will be on the road to giving a scientific account of the nature of individualism, freedom, blame and responsibility. We will be in a position to justify or offer reasons why it is possible for each of us to enter into the process of changing our social institutions and in taking the initiative in determining our own future both at the personal and social level. This is the task of the social scientists. If they succeed, they will have cleansed that baby that was born in the West so that it can, under the influence of science, be nurtured to adulthood. They can do so only if they accept organicism, interbehaviorism and process philosophy as a foundation. Through this approach they can be both scientific and humane and they will not empty the baby with the bath.