




Interbehavioral quarterly

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We can analyze a given instance of behavior in its relation to the current setting and to antecedent events in the history of the species and of the individual.

B. F. Skinner: "The steep and thorny way to a science of behavior", American Psychologist, 1975, 30, 42-49.

The response of the animal to a stimulating object is not determined by the object alone, but by the nature of the environmental context; under two different environmental contexts, two "mutually exclusive" behavior patterns may be developed.

Z.-Y. Kuo: THE DYNAMICS OF BEHAVIOR DEVELOPMENT: AN EPIGENETIC VIEW, Random House, 1967, p. 169.

The results of these experiments prove one important point: when a bird is brought up in an environmental context in which he does not have to fly, he may not acquire a behavior pattern of flight—even though flight is not inhibited or restricted—while other patterns are being developed and fixated. This failure to form an actual flight pattern is not due to a lack of appropriate stimuli for the "instinct of flight" at its "critical period," nor to a lack of exercise or of strength in the neuromuscular system for flight, for many could fly when frightened by the chasing dog. The important fact to be borne in mind is that the combined factors of developmental history and environmental context alone are often sufficient to reduce the range of behavioral potentials, a reduction that does not necessarily involve anatomico-physiological factors; it is a reduction of plasticity in the formation of new patterns without any need for reference to mythical pre-determined neural organization.

Kuo, *ibid.*, p. 174-175

Some new and recent works that may be of interest to readers include Barber, Spanos, and Chaves: HYPNOSIS, IMAGINATION, AND HUMAN POTENTIAL, Pergamon Press, 1975. The de-spooking work of these authors for hypnosis and acupuncture has been previously reported in this publication. R.G. Heyduk published "Rated preference of musical compositions as it relates to complexity and exposure frequency" in Perception and Psychophysics, 1975, 17, 84-91, which examines the influence of situational or setting conditions and individual differences. Rollo Handy and E.C. Harwood attempt to clarify the Dewey-Bentley concepts in reviewing John Spiegel's TRANSACTIONS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND SOCIETY. The review is entitled "Transactional procedures misunderstood" and appears in The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1975, 34, 103-112. In an article entitled "Eye contact as a setting event for infant learning", Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1974, 17, 250-263, Kathleen Bloom notes the important but neglected role of setting events in S-R relationships and undertakes an experimental study that examines them specifically. Among the social learning theorists the setting or context is receiving increased attention as a factor in accounting for changes in responses when successive stimuli are the same. Several studies by J.L. Gewirtz are of this nature. It is encouraging that he has dropped the drive abstraction and replaced it with the events of setting; e.g., "Some contextual determinants of stimulus potency" in R.D. Parke (ed.), RECENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, Academic Press, 1972. The recognition of the distinction between stimulus object and stimulus function would also be useful in these studies.

Editorial Trillas, a publishing firm in Mexico City, and the Principia Press of Chicago have contracted for a Spanish translation of Kantor: INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY. A revision by Kantor and Smith of Kantor's A SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY is now in the final proof-print stage under the new title: THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERBEHAVIORAL SURVEY. We will provide further information in the next issue.

We are pleased to announce that Ronald Heyduk of Kenyon College and Donna Cone of Lynchburg Training School & Hospital, Lynchburg, Virginia will be joining the Quarterly as associate editors. We hope that with their assistance and the continued contributions of our readers we will be able to improve the medium.

Introductory psychology books are one of the best indicators of current orientations, directions, and emphases in psychology. A sampling of the current crop of which there is a plethora is not encouraging for those who wish to see the discipline established on events. Those that seem to stray somewhat less from an event-based approach than others are Whittaker: INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY, Saunders Co., and Morgan & King, same title, McGraw-Hill. Ken Dallett's IT'S ALL IN YOUR MIND: UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY, National Press, 1973, offers much of the usual doctrine and then surprisingly describes the absurdity of much of it, often with the same assumptions, however, that produced the initial difficulty. For example, "Our language describes external actions well, but cannot describe the inner workings of man without populating him with littler men who hide inside, do our thinking, and pull our strings" (p.51). In most of the texts, the two areas that seem to give rise to the most doctrinaire assumptions are perception and brain function and neither Whittaker nor Morgan and King escape them. There is growing emphasis in the textbooks on "cognition", "information processing", and popular topics such as "expansion of consciousness" which all continue to confuse constructs with events. To indicate the orientation

of a few of these works a page of quotations entitled "Shades of Medieval Theology" is provided. If readers have run across others that could be singled out either positively or negatively we would offer the information in this column. Statements that would make useful quotes either from introductory texts or others that could be used under "Shades" would be gratefully received.

A COMMENTARY

An article in the Psychological Bulletin, 1974, 81, 1026-1028, by a Swedish psychologist, Bo Ekehammer, entitled "Interactionism in personality from a historical perspective" gives prominent place to Kantor's contributions. However, the author seems to confuse the interaction of inter-behaviorism with the notion of mental or phenomenal interactionism. He sees much commonality with Koffka, Lewin, Murry, Sullivan, Mischel, and Angyal: their "central idea" "is essentially the same."

It seems to be very difficult to convey the vital difference between the interbehavioral event-based approach and the traditional construct-based approach. Our thinking is so conditioned by Western dualism that totally disparate alternatives are seen as modifications or new developments within the same old metaphysics. For example, Ekehammer attributes to Kantor the importance of distinguishing "between the physical and psychological world." How can it be made clear that interbehaviorism holds the entire world including human interactions to be physical, that a psychological event is the interaction of organism and object, not something occurring inside the individual that is different from or additional to the interaction? How can it be made clear that interbehavior comprises a field of object-organism interactions (interbehaviors) in a setting or context and not a phenomenal field ("psychological world") inside the organism interacting with the physical world? And how can it be made clear that interbehaviorism holds to these interacting field events and does not impose constructs?

It is misleading to speak of a "psychological world" or a "psychological environment." Such reference to verbal construction denotes working from an organism-centered and construct-based approach. It implies that there is meaning or knowledge or awareness that is additional to or different from the interaction, that these are inputs to the interactions rather than being constituted by them. The interbehaviorist insists that meaning is the interactional event, an interaction of a physical organism with a physical object in a physical setting. There is no psychological world or psychological environment that is somehow different from a physical world or physical environment. Psychological events are distinguished from other classes of events by the level of organizations and characteristics of those events, not by being non-physical. The term "psychological world" implies the existence of such non-events as phenomenal field or mind in addition to physical organism and physical object. As we quoted Lucretius in the November 1970 Newsletter (Vol. 1, Nr. 5): "Therefore everything in existence is, fundamentally, made out of two things. There are bodies and there is the void in which these bodies have their places and through which they move in different directions...nothing can act or be acted upon without body and nothing can afford space except the void and the empty. Therefore, apart from the void and bodies it is impossible for there to exist in the sum of things any residual

third substance. Such a substance could never at any time come within the reach of our senses, nor could any man lay hold of it by any process of reasoning." It is such a "third substance" that phenomenologists assume and which must be distinguished from the events that interbehaviorists adhere to. Assuredly interbehaviorism can make a contribution to personality theory, but only when it is understood that the interbehaviorist's interaction consists of confrontable events and that of the phenomenologist's of verbal constructions that involve a confusion of such constructions with ongoing events.

SHADES OF MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY

Jerome Kagan & Ernest Havemann: Psychology: An Introduction, 2nd ed., Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1972.

Psychology is the science that systematically studies and attempts to explain observable behavior and its relationship to the unseen mental processes that go on inside the organism and to the external events in the environment. (p.9)

Roger Brown & Richard J. Herrnstein: Psychology, Little, Brown, 1975.

Mental Processes—the bridge between stimulus and response—are obscure because they occur out of sight. (p. 438)

We can experience external stimuli only as they are transformed by our senses and perception. (p. 438)

The first stages of response to a physical stimulus are triggered automatically by activation of a sense organ. Then attention rehearses and analyzes some aspects of the icon [after-effect of stimulus removed] and not others, supplementing them with information stored in memory. (p. 438-439)

W. Lambert Gardiner: Psychology: A Story of a Search, Brooks/Cole, 1970.

The psychologist is concerned with the internal processes of the organism and with the function of the organism. (p.4)

The system studied by the psychologist is unique in that it can be viewed from the inside as well as from the outside. The manifestation of the processes within the organism as viewed from the outside is behavior and as viewed from the inside is experience. (p.4)

Experience must ultimately be based on the various forms of physical energy that impinge on our receptors. Physical energy is transformed into nerve impulses and then into sensations. Although some psychologists have attempted to explain all experience in terms of sensation, others have argued that it is necessary to go beyond sensation. (p.5)

Psychology is the science that studies the nervous system. This system is unique among all the systems studied by scientists in that it may be studied from the inside as well as from the outside. The manifestation of the functioning of the nervous system as seen from the outside is behavior; the manifestation of the nervous system as seen from the inside is experience. (p. 127)

Richard Lazarus: The Riddle of Man: An Introduction to Psychology, Prentice-Hall, 1974.

There is no way for man to know what the environment is really like outside of what he mentally constructs of this environment by his sense organs and perceptual activity. Perception is "true" only in the sense that the knowledge obtained serves us well in our interactions with the environment.
In short, our perception of the external world is a schematic affair, based on what has been required for species survival during evolutionary history, rather than a direct mirroring of all that actually exists. Our perceptual experience is so compelling, subjectively, that it is difficult to divest ourselves of the literal view that perception is the discovery of how the environment truly is and to adopt a relativistic view that we detect some of the qualities of objects and events but probably cannot know all of reality. (p. 58-60)

Anthony Davids & Trygg Engen: Introductory Psychology, Random House, 1975.

Chapter 7 deals with sensations. All approaches and theories of psychology have considered them the gateways to the mind, the channels of information through which humans acquire the knowledge and the content of their consciousness. (p. 143)

For all our unique thoughts, hopes, and behaviors, without exception, can be traced to activity in the brain. (p. 145)

Ernest R. Hilgard, Richard C. Atkinson, & Rita L. Atkinson: Introduction to Psychology, 6th ed., Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975.

Neural impulses from your eye are related to your brain where various features of the stimulus are analyzed and compared with information about past events stored in your memory. (p. 32)

Our perception of events depends on how our sense organs detect stimuli and our brain interprets information coming from the senses. (p. 32)

To understand behavior we need to know something of how the sensory mechanisms are constructed and how they mediate the sensations of light, sound, touch, taste, and the like. But perception goes beyond the discrimination of single stimuli; the human organism must be able to interpret and react to patterns of stimuli. He must be able to extract information from the changing array of stimulation provided by the environment.

CRM Books: Psychology Today: An Introduction, 2nd ed., 1972.

The visual information—the lights and the musical notes—are the input; whatever transformations occurred between them is the processing. (p. 153)

Robert E. Silverman: Psychology, 2nd ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1974.

Once the brain interprets a stimulus event, it relays a message through the nervous system to the muscles and the glands; this message dictates to the body how to respond to the stimulus. (p. 62)

Bouquets of Roses: A Final Reply to Mountjoy

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I have been struck by the honest sincerity and open friendliness of the recent series of exchanges between Martin (1973, a, b) and Mountjoy (1973, 1975). It is apparent that we are in agreement in our goal to improve the technology of higher education (teaching) and even that an operant-psychology-derived technology is productive in that effort. An important area of disagreement remains, however.

Mountjoy (1975, p.3) points accurately to the distinction between the technology and science of college teaching, a distinction previously drawn by Martin (1974). Mountjoy states: "The empirical finding is that operant technology does change the behavior of college students. The present state of the art is such that there is still a great deal of room for improvement." Agreed! This is where the discussion started, with one approach of the science of psychology, presented by Martin (1973, a).

It is precisely because the learning (behavior) of college students is an interbehavior between students and environmental variables, including instructors, that the science (and, ultimately, the technology) of college teaching must take into account the individual's contribution to the event. It is this transaction that operant psychology does not concern itself with, rather concentrating on the environmental conditions. In an effort to improve the technology of college teaching, Martin has described a research program (1971, 1972, 1973, a, b, 1974, 1975) which focuses on the transactional context and the individual's perception of the event.

Mountjoy and I are in total agreement in our hope to make a contribution to the improvement of classroom instruction. The application of operant technology to college teaching may be viewed as an interbehavioral transaction with scientific psychology, each contributes to and defines the other, as London (1972) has pointed out in another context. Both Mountjoy and Martin serve heuristic purposes in this transaction (event). I look forward to meeting Dr. Mountjoy in person to exchange ideas, after the long-running and congenial discussion through Dr. Smith's Quarterly.

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A Critique of Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development
from the Viewpoint of Interbehavioral Psychology

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Developmental psychologists typically concern themselves with progressive changes in the behavior of organisms. Working primarily with humans, these investigators attempt to single out behaviors in which the changes observed can be systematically and reliably related to the passage of time. Among the "age-developmental" actions that have been studied are grasping, walking, speaking, and many other skills usually displayed by humans during their first few years of life. The majority of developmental psychologists are concerned with the growth of humans from birth to adolescence, simply because that period encompasses rapid and noticeable changes in many different kinds of behavior; and because widespread public interest in child education makes it useful for politicians to channel public funds into child development research.

So long as developmentalists observe and describe changes in the behavior of their subjects and try to show that such changes are correlated with the age of the organism, they may be respected as psychologists and scientists. Unfortunately, some have been unable to resist the temptation to seek recognition by imposing elaborate mentalistic theories upon their data, instead of presenting their findings in the context of interbehavioral events. Even more unfortunate is the fact that they have achieved recognition. This is probably as much the shortcoming of the people these workers seek to impress (their peers and the money-controllers) as of the developmentalists themselves; for mentalism is extremely pervasive in our society, and even otherwise well-educated men have been unable to free themselves of this barrier to progress in science. The result has been a collection of developmental theories which have scientifically indefensible non-entities as their central referent.

An example is Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development. It is this theory, as described by Kohlberg in Hoffman & Hoffman (1966, pp. 383-431) that provides the subject of the present paper. Selected aspects of Kohlberg's orientation, theory, and conclusions will be outlined, with critical comments interspread throughout. The critical perspective will be that of scientific naturalism, as exemplified by the interbehavioral approach to psychology (see Kantor; 1963, 1969). It seems appropriate, therefore, to devote several paragraphs to a brief description of the principles which form the nucleus of the interbehavioral system of scientific psychology.

Kantor's Psychology

Interbehavioral psychology was founded by J.R. Kantor, a philosopher

of science and historian of psychology. Kantor recognized that the widely accepted S-R formula of behaviorism could not adequately represent a psychological event, simply because it implies that the stimulus affects, and/or effects, the response while the response has no effect on the stimulus. But responses do have effects on the associated stimuli: stimuli and response interact. Thus the name interbehavioral psychology was used to identify this new approach, and R+S was adopted to symbolize the only legitimate basic datum of psychology: an event consisting of an interaction between a stimulus function and a response function. The term "function" is appended to the two key words to emphasize the fact that the effect of a given stimulus or response need not remain constant across or within situations. Thus the "function" in a given interbehavioral situation is just as important as the response and/or stimulus.

Another core concept of interbehavioral psychology is that of an inter-behavioral field. No psychological event occurs in a vacuum. Each is surrounded by an interbehavioral field consisting of setting factors (including the variables usually manipulated in experimental settings as "dependent variables", such as age, sex, and deprivation), the inter-behavioral history of the organism (including both phylogenetic and ontogenetic history), and the medium of contact between the stimulus function and the response function (air, light, or direct physical contact, for example).

A third basic idea of Kantor's system is that of the scientist-observer, who is himself operating in a larger interbehavioral field. In this larger field, the scientist-observer constitutes the response function and the inter-behavioral field-event he is observing can be regarded as the stimulus function. Again, the same kinds of setting factors mentioned above are present with respect to this larger interbehavioral field.

An important point is that the scientist-observer always interacts with the field-event itself; never with constructs or other abstractions imposed on the original event. When an observer turns to the study of such abstractions, he can no longer be called a scientist, nor can his activity be called scientific. Instead, he becomes a rationalistic philosopher, often engaging in the invention of ever more abstract constructions which are inevitably offered as (or taken to be) explanatory principles. Unfortunately, the original event is very likely to be completely forgotten in the process of building models from these abstractions. The end product is often an elaborate edifice which, though purporting to explain the original event, succeeds only in demonstrating the model-building skill of the inventor. In the words of Kantor, "This amounts to a shift in the problem of investigation. Instead of asking what the original events are like and how they may be subsumed under precise laws, attention is directed to the behavior of the experimenter. Even if such a shift results in the collection of precise and predictable results, it still bespeaks a weak understanding of the task of research " (1969, p. 381). As for explanatory value, the resulting abstractions are worthless hypostatizations

which attempt to explain events by simply re-naming them -- a procedure that often fails to satisfy even small children.

Interbehavioral psychology insists on studying events "...without entangling itself with purely traditional constructions " (Kantor, 1969, p. 376). The scientific psychologist allows neither his choice of a research problem nor his interpretation of events to be warped by the mythopoeic transcendentalism that has dominated Western thought since the invention of spiritual man by the Church Fathers. He resists the efforts of others to impose the traditional autistic construction "soul" or any of its many derivatives and surrogates (such as "mind", "will", "character" and "inner capacities") on his findings. Instead, the scientist seeks naturalistic explanations of his data; and the constructs he employs as descriptive aids are always tied directly to the original events or to summations of them.

Kohlberg's Orientation

Now that the elements of Interbehavioral Psychology have been presented as the basis for the critical remarks to follow, the discussion of Kohlberg's theory can be undertaken.

The Focus of Kohlberg's Work

Kohlberg's description of his efforts begins with a look at the past and current approaches to the study of children's morality. He says that an interest in morality itself has recently reappeared after a period of absorption in concern for social adjustments. Here, Kohlberg suggests that he regards morality to be different from social adjustment. He makes this very plain when he states:

This increased interest in moral development seems to be partly the result of recent history, which has sharpened awareness of the distinction between internal moral development and outward socialization and social adjustment. The barbarities of the Nazi and Stalinist systems and the hollow lives apparent in our own affluent society have made it painfully obvious that adjustment to the group is no substitute for moral maturity. (p. 383).

To the naturalistic scientist, the phrase "internal moral development" raises an immediate and basic question: How can a scientist confront internal moral development? The obvious answer is that he cannot. Internal moral development cannot be an observable event or series of events, so it must be a construct. As a construct, there is only one way it can be defensible from the viewpoint of the natural scientist: it must be derived directly from interbehavioral events, and defined very strictly in terms of such natural events. It must be asked whether Kohlberg's idea of internal moral development meets this simple criterion. In several

statements Kohlberg reveals that he regards internal moral development as anything but a derivation from natural events. For example, he asserts that "Morality has generally been defined as conscience, as a set of cultural rules of social action which have been internalized by the individual. Moral development has been conceived as the increase in such internalization of basic cultural rules" (p. 384, emphasis added). More to the point, Kohlberg says that the focus of recent (his own) work and that of Piaget has been upon the judgemental side of moral development: "...the internalization of a standard implied a capacity to make judgements in terms of that standard" (p. 384). In these two quotes there is no reference to any natural event; no hint that such terms as "internalization of rules" and "capacity to make judgements" have any references in the world of observable events. These items are apparently offered as common sense entities which everyone knows exist, but which no one can define. It appears, then, that Kohlberg departs from natural science at the outset of his investigation, by choosing a mentalistic non-entity as the central focus of his research. The fact that he regards morality as something apart from naturally occurring events is underscored heavily when he says that much moral research has not been specifically addressed to a "distinctive set of questions basic to researchers, and educated men alike", but rather "has viewed morality as a type of social behavior learned like any other social behavior" (p. 385). It could not be plainer that Kohlberg believes he is dealing with a trans-spatial entity, which, like the soul, has the miraculous ability to influence environmental events while remaining perfectly isolated from them. His selection of a research problem has been profoundly affected by traditional Western spiritism.

Kohlberg's View of Moral Character

After outlining his opinions regarding the meaning of morality, Kohlberg devotes several pages to a consideration of moral character and moral conduct. He begins by offering several definitions of "character" which have been used by psychologists at one time or another; from the vacuous evasion "sum total of a set of virtues", to the more precise "adhering to cultural norms of action where such adherence involves effort, self-control, or sacrifice." He then says that "Psychologists have agreed with common opinion that moral character traits should be assessed from actions, rather than from judgements or feelings" (p. 386). Citing the work of Rau (1965) and Hartshorne & May (1928-1930), he admits that experimental evidence gives no basis for the notion of stable character traits such as "honesty". For example, these experiments demonstrated that situational factors (setting factors) were more important than supposed "honesty" in predicting cheating behavior. But Kohlberg is not satisfied. He cites Burton's (1963) factor analysis of the Hartshorne & May data which "...indicated a small general factor in the various experimental tests of classroom cheating" (p. 387). Kohlberg takes this as evidence for a stable "personality factor" which is "more general than a specific attitude toward honesty or fear of getting caught" (p. 387). As if this were not a sufficiently Olympian leap of faith, he goes on to assert that "These findings suggest a core of truth to common sense notions of general good character, and

provide some justification for adding up measures of various aspects of moral conduct into a total assessment of moral character " (p. 387).

Here we have seen an example of how the mystical transcendentalism of the Patristics continues to enthrall twentieth-century thinking: In the face of hard data to the contrary, Kohlberg still managed to rescue the cherished notion of a supernaturally-existing "character" which is just another name for the construction dreamed up by Hellenistic thinkers as Man's answer for all: the soul.

Having saved "moral character" from death due to the demonstration of its non-existence, Kohlberg is then able to go on to a discussion by some different ways of defining it. He begins by considering the notion of character as "superego strength", another name for "strength of conscience." He says this conception fares badly because "Conformity to a moral rule has not been found to bear much relationship to the strength of stated belief in that rule " (p. 388). He does not let this pass unqualified, however. In a footnote he states "The relationships between moral judgments and moral conduct are more complex than these negative findings suggest, and will be discussed in detail later" (p. 388). The promised detail consists of a rather artful argument in which Kohlberg attempts to convince his readers that while moral judgments and moral conduct are very different, it is still possible to infer a common developmental process for them. He says: "The fact that when the chips are down children do not do what they say does not mean that development of judgment and development of conduct go along on two independent tracks, however. Verbal judgments may not be trustworthy reports of conduct but they may still reflect the same basic developmental process " (p. 408). This statement occurs right after Kohlberg has stated that moral judgment does not show until early adolescence while moral conduct appears to develop early; that moral judgment seems to exhibit general and stable individual differences while conduct is situation-specific; and that moral judgment develops in the same direction across cultures while moral conduct develops in line with social groups. In spite of careful re-reading, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that Kohlberg has seriously contradicted himself with respect to a fundamental hypothesis of his theory. In one statement he points out three major differences between the development of moral judgment and that of moral conduct; and in the next he blithely says they reflect the same basic developmental process. This behavior indicates that it is highly unlikely that any event could have led Kohlberg to abandon his exceptionally strong insistence on the existence of a transcendent moral character.

Following his dismissal of the "superego" view of character, Kohlberg looks at the interpretation of moral character as "good habits". This view, he says, is typified by the parental faith that exposure to Sunday school, Boy Scouts, and other character-education situations will build character. He cites several studies which fail to support such an idea. He goes on to say that there are contradictory findings with respect to the effect of

of punishment and reward on resistance to temptation. True to his spiritualistic philosophy, he concludes by asserting that "...direct training and physical types of punishment may be effective in producing short-run situational conformity but do not directly produce general internalized habits of moral character carried into later life, carried outside the home, or carried into permissive situations." (p. 389). Once again Kohlberg proclaims the existence of a mystical entity, which transcends situational factors. The argument seems to be: "If it can be affected by environmental variations, it can't be the real thing." This is the same imperviousness to scientific investigation that was given to the soul of Man (and to the essence of God) by the Church Fathers in the first and second centuries after Christ. As Kantor (1963, p. 228) put it, "...the greatest and most authentic realities are those that cannot be grasped, pictured, or understood. It is such realities that are of interest to Christianity in its philosophic aspects. And it was interest in these realities that engendered the Christian scorn for evidence and reasoning based upon observation." Kohlberg stands as an example of a present-day victim of this anti-scientific philosophy which has either stifled, misdirected, or controverted naturalistic investigation in every field of scientific inquiry for nearly nineteen centuries.

Having demonstrated once again the primacy of faith over data, Kohlberg turns to the merits of viewing character as "ego strength". This, he says, roughly corresponds to what is commonly termed "strength of will", and is presumed to include the ability to assess long-range outcomes of actions and to delay immediate gratification in favour of greater future reward. Also included is the ability to put oneself in the place of another. Kohlberg says that "In psychoanalytic theory, these factors of will, foresight, and empathy are included with other aspects of decision-making and emotional control in the concept of "ego-strength." (p. 390).

Kohlberg then cites some studies which he views as supporting the ego-strength interpretation of moral character. The first is a factor analysis of character ratings among adults done by Webb (1915), which yielded a "will-factor". Next, he points out that Hartshorne and May (1930), found persistence and nondistractibility on achievement tests to be correlated with the moral traits of honesty and service. He says these early findings are supported by more recent factor-analytic investigations and by a study by Peck and Havighurst (1960) in which ego-strength ratings given by psychologist to 35 small city adolescents "...correlated well ($r = .69$) with total moral character scores (honesty, responsibility, loyalty, courage, friendliness) as rated by community informants (schoolmates, teachers, and other adults)" (p. 390). Kohlberg admits the obvious; that it is "...quite possible that these correlations were inflated by halo effects, since the raters had some knowledge of the moral character ratings" (p. 390). In spite of the admission, he insists on the validity of the ego-strength idea by adding, "Nevertheless, the correlations with any other 'good' aspects of personality" (p. 390). This established, he lists five different types of ego-strength variables, and describes correlational studies which relate each of them to some aspect of moral behav-

ior. As might be expected, the five classes of variables are all as amorphous as ego-strength itself. Consider the list: Intelligence, capacity to anticipate future events, capacity to maintain focused attention, capacity to control unsocialized fantasies, and satisfaction with self and environment. All five types of ego-strength variables refer to some inner capacity or state of the individual. Though such constructs may be interpreted as having been derived from natural events, the following quote leaves no doubt that Kohlberg follows the mainstream of spiritistic philosophy by forgetting (or ignoring) the events while giving the constructs an existence independent of them:

The above findings (those outlined above by the present authors), in the aggregate, provide some support for the interpretation of moral character as ego, rather than super-ego, strength. This interpretation implies that the major consistencies in moral conduct represent decision-making capacities rather than fixed behavior traits. It is thus consistent with the findings on situational variation, which suggested that moral conduct was the product of a situational decision. (pp. 391-392).

Kohlberg has not only reified the construct "decision-making capacities", he has put it in actual control of the very behavior from which it was originally inferred.

At this point in Kohlberg's chapter, it is clear that he subscribes to the ego-strength view of moral character. Kohlberg is then ready to discuss attempts to fix the age at which moral character is formed. He concludes that although experimental investigations have indicated that moral behavior as measured by stealing and cheating are not age-related, and although adult's ratings of moral character-traits of children also fail to vary regularly with age, these negative findings could result from the fact that "...morally conforming conduct poorly represents underlying moral attitudes or 'moral control'" (pp. 392-393). Yet again, Kohlberg has implied that events are nothing compared to mystical constructs.

The Developmental Theory of Moral Judgement

It is from this philosophic orientation, steeped in the transcendentalism of Plotinus and St. Augustine, that Kohlberg approaches his investigation of morality. At the outset, he declares his intention to ignore events in favour of constructs: "While moral behavior has not lent itself to age-developmental analysis, the study of moral judgement has readily suggested basic stages of development " (p. 394). This is underscored by another statement made by Kohlberg in the same paragraph, in which he says that moral knowledge scores (presumably based on the behavior of saying the rules) "... seem primarily to indicate intelligence, cultural background, and desire to make a good impression, rather than basic moral development " (p. 394).

It could not be plainer that Kohlberg regards events as superficial and unimportant compared to spiritistic constructions such as "basic moral development". Yet he is forced to rely on events (verbal interbehavior) as the fundamental data of his investigations. As an example of this kind of data, Kohlberg offers the reply of ten-year-old Danny, who was asked whether he could tell his father about a transgression of his brother. Danny's reply was ambivalent, pointing out that if he didn't, he might be spanked by his father; but if he did, he could get beaten up by his brother. Kohlberg lays his "other-wordly" orientation bare when he declares: "Obviously, whether Danny decides it is right to maintain authority or right to maintain peer 'loyalty' is of little interest compared to the fact that his decision will be based on his anticipation of who can hit harder" (p. 394). It is apparent that Kohlberg has exactly reversed the priorities of interest. Danny's behavior in an actual conflict situation (the ultimate outcome of any decision he makes) is what must be dealt with, not "internal processes" inferred from his verbalizations.

Kohlberg's Goal and Method

Kohlberg indicates that his research has as its immediate goal the understanding of responses to hypothetical moral conflict stories which are characteristic of an age group. Such research, according to him, involved analysis of the underlying thought structures found at different ages in order to discover general developmental directions. Both the goal itself and the type of analysis employed raise serious questions.

Regarding the goal, what is meant by "understanding"? Kohlberg implies that "understanding" goes hand in hand with the ability to isolate contributing factors. Thus "understanding" implies "ability to manipulate". Perhaps Kohlberg would object strongly to so utilitarian a view of the term "understanding", but it must be admitted that such a view removes the undesirable vagueness inherent in the term. It may now be inferred that Kohlberg proposes to discover variables that influence children's statements concerning hypothetical moral conflict situations. This is an entirely commendable proposal, consistent with naturalistic investigation. Unfortunately, it will later become clear that Kohlberg completely loses sight of the simplicity and boundedness of the original behavioral field-events he observed, and somehow convinced himself he was dealing with such transcendental non-entities as morality, conscience, and universal human values.

His intention to analyze underlying thought structures simply reflects his spiritistic approach. Even though he has no choice but to study verbal behavior, he says he is examining "thought structures". Again, a rejection of events in favour of constructs is apparent. For Kohlberg, the construct has become the basic stuff of research -- possible because constructs may be divorced from the events they were originally intended to summarize or illuminate, and can be linguistically tailored to fit theoretical orientations much more readily than data. (Perhaps this is the basis for the expression "hard data" -- data is "hard" in the sense that it cannot be stretched or compressed by linguistic machinations as can fluid constructs).

Kohlberg's Categorization of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg defines six general types of moral orientation, each of which "could be defined in terms of its specific stance on 32 aspects of morality" (p. 400).

The three "stages of morality" and the six orientations subsumed under them stand out as an example of imposing constructs on events. In the ordinary practice of science, it is perfectly legitimate to derive constructs from events so long as the events retain their primacy and the constructs remain merely summarizing agents. In the present case, the events are verbal responses of boys to hypothetical conflict situations imposed under specific conditions by specific persons. It is highly unlikely that such grand and complex constructs as "naive instrumental hedonism" and "morality of individual principles of conscience" can be shown to have been derived from such circumscribed events. Instead, mythopoetic constructions founded in the folklore of the sociocultural matrix were imposed on the events, so that the boundedness of the original interbehavioral event-field is forgotten in favour of the nearly limitless scope of the spiritistic constructs.

To show how each orientations might be defined in terms of its "specific stance on 32 aspects of morality", Kohlberg offers an example of the definition of the six orientations in terms of aspect 10, "Motivation for Rule Obedience or Moral Action.":

- Orientation 1: Obey rules to avoid punishment.
- Orientation 2: Conform to obtain rewards, have favours returned, and so on.
- Orientation 3: Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
- Orientation 4: Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt.
- Orientation 5: Conform to maintain respect of impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare.
- Orientation 6: Conform to avoid self-condemnation.

(p. 400)

It will be noticed that each "definition" can be derived linguistically from each orientation, in complete absence of any contact with events. As such, they do not constitute definitions at all, but are merely re-statements, expansions, or reconstructions of the constructs.

Kohlberg then presents a figure which shows how the percentage of responses reflecting each of the six orientations changes as age changes (p. 403). On the whole, the figure shows that the greater percentage (more than 70%) of the responses of seven-year-olds were classified as reflecting Orientation 1, while practically none reflected Orientation 6, and only slightly more reflected Orientation 4. For boys of age 10, Orientation-1 responses were only about 32% of the total, while Orientation-4 responses accounted for more than 15%. Orientation-6 responses were still essentially non-existent for these boys.

In the 13-year-old group, Orientation-4 responses accounted for about 32%, while Orientation-1 commanded only about 12%. Some Orientation-6 responses appeared in this group, comprising about 4% of the total. Among boys of age, 16, the last age shown, Orientation-4 responses were still the most prevalent, taking around 33% of the total, with Orientation-1 taking only about 11% and Orientation-6 about 5%. One should be careful not to forget that these data do not represent successive observations of the same boys at four age levels. Rather, the data at each age level is obtained from a different group of boys.

Definition of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg asks how "level of maturity of moral judgement" (as distinguished from "intellectual maturity") might be defined. His answer is: "...a more mature judgement is a more moral judgement. This does not mean that a child who utters mature judgements is a more moral person, as judged by the standards of his community. It means that his judgements more closely correspond to genuine moral judgements as these have been defined by philosophers." (p. 405). According to Kohlberg, most philosophers agree that moral judgements are those which concern the "good" and the "right" of actions. Kohlberg himself takes this definition a step further by suggesting that many pronouncements about the "good" and "right" are not moral judgements; rather, they are esthetic, prudential, or technological evaluations. In contrast to such statements, he says, "...moral judgements tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds" (p. 405). He cites his own work (Kohlberg, 1958) in support of that statement.

The usefulness of Kohlberg's definition of a moral judgement as distinct from esthetic or other judgements lies in the fact that a statement may be labelled a genuine moral judgement without regard to whether the examiner agrees with the judgement.

Developmental Trends in Moral Judgement

Kohlberg says that the trend of development in Western culture is toward a greater frequency of genuine moral judgements. He further states that "...such an interpretation of the direction of moral judgement implies that the development is in many ways the same, regardless of the child's nation (in western culture), social class, peer group, or sex. While such a belief flies in the face of prevalent notions of unlimited cultural relativism, it is somewhat supported by empirical evidence" (p. 406). The evidence is inferred from studies of various groups by Piaget (specific studies not cited) and Kohlberg (1964). Kohlberg adds that "The statement that the same stages of judgement were found means that children's answers could be categorized the same without overlooking obviously new kinds of responses, that individual children were consistent in stage regardless of group membership, and that the age order of the stages was the same in all social groups" (p. 406).

Here, Kohlberg is to be commended for remaining close to the original interbehavioral events he observed (the children's answers) and his own interbehavior with them (categorization into stages). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that his discovery of age-related differences in the count of verbalizations

that he considers to fall into certain self-created categories "flies in the face of prevalent notions of unlimited cultural relativism," regardless of whether or not such differences are observed across many cultural groups. Few people are likely to dispute that age-related differences in the count of moral statements which "tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be grounded on objective, impersonal or ideal grounds" (p. 405), will be found across cultures. But the most parsimonious explanation of these differences is that a child must learn to verbalize about hypothetical constructs such as "universal ideals"; further, a child must learn to verbalize in a manner that will be described by others as "inclusive, consistent, objective, and impersonal." There is no reason to believe that such learning would not be age-related in any and all cultures.

Social Influences on the Development of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg continues to take issue with the idea that social groups determine moral development by asserting that his findings indicate participation in various social groups merely stimulates the "development of basic moral values", rather than causing "conflicting developmental trends in morality" (p. 407). As he puts it,

The child lives in a total social world in which perceptions of the law, of the peer group, and of parental teachings all influence one another. While various people and groups make conflicting immediate demands upon the child, they do not seem to present the child with basically conflicting or different general moral values. In the course of "normal" development, the conflicts between the demands of groups and individuals constitute the material for the discrimination and development of such general moral values."

(p. 407)

The problem here is that Kohlberg has yet again deluded himself into believing he is examining the unexaminable. His reference to "conflicting immediate demands" made by various groups seems to be a reference to a concrete interbehavioral event. But in spite of his own admission that different groups make conflicting demands on the behavior of the child, he maintains that these different groups share the same basic set of "general moral values." This can be seen as a denial that general moral values influence the behavior of the group. If such values had any effect, the behavior of the different groups with respect to these values would be the same (because they share the same "general moral values"), and no group would make conflicting demands on the behavior of its members. Apparently, Kohlberg has again contradicted himself while trying to make a crucial point. It seems very inconsistent with ordinary logic to assert that different groups will demand different kinds of moral behavior if their definitions of moral behavior are the same. Conversely, the fact that they do demand different kinds of moral behavior necessarily implies that their definitions of moral behavior differ.

The difficulty here probably stems from the fact that Kohlberg has simply ignored actual events (behavior labelled as "moral" and the act of defining and labelling such behavior) in order to discuss impressive-sounding mystical nonentities like "general moral values". One of the most useful properties of such transcendent constructions is their complete immunity to scientific and logical practice. With this immunity, they can be endowed with whatever attribute seems convenient. In the present case, one finds that "general moral values" do not affect the behavior of groups (because they behave differently even though they ostensibly share the same values); nor are the "general moral values" of a group member affected by the behavior of the group. Yet the behavior of the groups "constitute the material for the discrimination and development of such general moral values" of the member (p. 407). So it can be seen that "general moral values" are shaped by the behavior of groups while remaining unaffected by that behavior. In addition, "general moral values" are the same across the groups that provide material for their discrimination and development. Such contradictory attributes cannot be denied, because they describe a linguistic invention, a name without a referent in the naturalistic world. It is the privilege of the inventor of such constructs to endow them with any attributes he wishes, without regard to the logical restrictions associated with mundane events. These non-entities transcend all such restrictions, and their users take full advantage of this property to make their arguments unassailable. Whether known to their users or not, these constructs can always be exposed as thinly-veiled linguistic substitutes for the soul. These **autistic constructions** continue the purpose of the soul: they give the human his godlike attributes, separating him once and for all from non-human creatures.

The Development of Guilt

Satisfied that he has made his point with respect to the development of moral judgement, Kohlberg turns next to the development of "guilt" and "other reactions to transgression". He considers these to be important aspects or morality, but not central components. The story is much the same; the basic data (responses of children to hypothetical situations) are largely ignored, while mentalistic constructs like "capacity for internal guilt" assume central importance. Thus story-completion responses of children are seen as indicating either "moral anxiety", "true guilt", or something in between the internal moral reaction of self-criticism and the externally focused anxiety represented by a preoccupation with punishment" (p. 411).

After discussing the effects of punishment on the development of guilt reactions, Kohlberg concludes that "successful study of the role of early punishment and genetically primitive forms of guilt in later conscience development may require extensive longitudinal study" (p. 413). It is doubtful that the most extensive longitudinal development will do more than clarify the effects of early punishment on later behaviors. The development of conscience will remain a matter for dualistic philosophers and theologians to discuss. There is no way for natural events, no matter how carefully and extensively observed, to yield information concerning supernatural inventions.

Kohlberg turns next to a discussion of the theory that guilt is dependent on the child's identification with, or taking the role of, the wronged or punishing other. In general, his interpretation of these theories is that "...positive and affectional relations to others are in general conducive to role-taking and acceptance of social standards " (p. 414). He also states that such a relationship need not be with a parent: "...a child should more readily accept the values of an adult who is liked or accepted..." (p. 414). He then says, "The greater acceptance of moral standards by warmly treated children does not appear to lead to greater moral control in terms of these standards, however." (p. 414).

The problem with Kohlberg's interpretation of the "identification" theories of guilt acquisition is that it centers on the child's acceptance of the "moral standards" of the adult, which according to Kohlberg, is not reflected by "moral control". One is led to the inference that "acceptance" is gauged by verbal interactions with the child, while "control" is measured by situational behavior and ratings. Seen this way, the assertion that "acceptance" does not lead to "control" is very similar to the earlier statement that "...when the chips are down, children do not do what they say..." (p. 408). It is not surprising to find Kohlberg emphasizing what they say ("acceptance of moral standards") over what they do ("moral control").

Summary and Conclusions

The present paper has offered a critical review of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral judgement as he described it in Hoffman & Hoffman (1964). Criticisms were presented from the viewpoint of interbehavioral psychology (Kantor; 1963, 1969). The central concepts of interbehavioral psychology were outlined, including the interbehavioral field-event, the scientist-observer, the primacy of events over constructs, and the rejection of dualistic assumptions. Following the sketch of Kantor's psychology, Kohlberg's orientation to the study of morality was examined and found to be grossly spiritistic. Next, Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral judgement was analyzed on the basis of his own description of it. Included in this analysis were an example of his basic data and a brief look at his methodology. Then attention was given to his categorization of moral judgement, and the notion of developmental trends in moral judgement. Finally Kohlberg's views concerning the development of guilt were briefly mentioned.

At every point in the analysis, Kohlberg's work was seen to be thoroughly inundated with dualistic assumptions. Such assumptions were apparent from the outset, when Kohlberg implied that "internal moral development" must be understood, rather than "outward social adjustment". This spiritistic orientation removes his work from the realm of scientific psychology and relegates it to idealistic philosophy. In the words of Kantor (1969, pp. 376-377)

While scientists in their investigations can hardly escape contacts with events, they can be so influenced by historical traditions as to select data and problems prejudicially and to employ methods that tend to distort the knowledge gained by the research. The worst consequence, obviously, is the emergence of the belief that what one is studying is something entirely different from the original events which suggested the problem to be investigated in the first place.

In addition to continually giving mystical constructs primacy over natural events, Kohlberg was found to have seriously contradicted himself with respect to the major points of his theory. The most serious contradiction occurred when he asserted that the development of moral judgement and the development of moral conduct are the same, after previously listing three dimensions along which they show different developmental patterns. Other contradictions appeared when he argued that moral judgement is unlearned, yet arises from efforts of the child to "make sense" of his environment. One further contradiction occurred when he stated that different groups make conflicting moral demands on a child, but that these groups share the same moral values.

In each instance, it was pointed out that the contradictions arose as a consequence of Kohlberg's insistence on dealing with ethereal constructions rather than with the field-events he actually observed. When dealing with linguistic constructs that name spiritistic non-entities, such contradictions can be termed "paradoxes" (as if calling them paradoxes added anything to knowledge). But in the world of natural events, contradictions are a warning that something is wrong. In Kohlberg's case, the thing that is wrong is his attempt to force events to correspond to prefabricated autistic constructions.

Though his enthrallment by traditional Christian doctrines prevented him from seeing his data in its naturalistic field, his data stand out as a valuable contribution to psychology. His records of the verbal responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas of many children of different ages living in various societies can be used to clarify the factors influencing such interbehavior and to illuminate the relation between these verbalizations and the acts of children.

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